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John Locke and his Second Treatise of Government (1690), had a major intellectual
impact on political controversies surrounding the American Revolution. Although later historians
tended to focus on proponents of the American Revolution from the American perspective like
Thomas Jefferson, noteworthy opponents of colonial rebellion like Samuel Johnson had very
much the same admiration for John Locke’s seminal ideas regarding human equality and
individual liberty. An examination of the contrary perspectives on Locke and revolution taken by
both of these writers sheds crucial light on conflicting legal assumptions surrounding the creation
of the United States. Both writers were scholars of John Locke and understood the concepts
Locke outlined in his Second Treatise, by utilizing Locke’s arguments in support of their own,
either for separation from England (Jefferson) or for allegiance to the mother country (Johnson).
By recourse to two primary texts, Taxation No Tyranny (1775) by Samuel Johnson, and the
Declaration of Independence (1776) by Thomas Jefferson, I aim in this thesis to investigate the
fundamental ideological positions of both writers, and how they make use of different Lockean
arguments to support their contrasting viewpoints on the legality of the American Revolution.
Samuel Johnson and Jefferson both shared an admiration for Locke’s concepts of
inalienable rights regarding life, liberty, and property. With regard to property and ownership,
Samuel Johnson criticized the American colonists for robbing Native Americans of their land
and, therefore, violating their fundamental Lockean right to original ownership in a state of
nature. Johnson believed in the fundamental legal priority of native inhabitants anywhere in the
world because of their original occupation of land. From John Locke’s Second Treatise, Johnson
derives his ideology toward original dominion. According to Locke’s ideas about property in a
state of nature, ownership exists in an equality of sharing, and possession of anything by an
individual is his or her own right of ownership: “nobody has originally a private dominion
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exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state” (Locke,
17). As Locke maintains, “[the] fruit or venison that nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no
enclosure…must be his…that another can no longer have any right to it” (Locke, 17). In the
Lockean state of nature, an individual has an innate right to freedom and property, and so the
“wild Indian” has dominion over his native land and resources. Samuel Johnson’s landmark
Dictionary of the English Language (1755) even cites Locke’s Second Treatise directly to
illustrate the meaning of the word dominion: “He could not have private dominion over that
which was under the private dominion of another.” The only means by which one could forfeit
his right to property is by means of consent.
Consent was usually missing in the colonial takeover of native land, and Johnson
therefore rightly viewed the imperialistic colonization of North America by Englishmen and
Frenchmen as outright robbery of indigenous people. According to Johnson, once the state of
nature ceased to exist, the Americans are justified in their utilization of the land under British
rule because they obtained plots of land through land grants from the crown. Because American
colonists were still loyal British subjects, they came to have a longstanding prescriptive right to
American land under British law, which over time, by way of the historical practicality of longterm dominion, replaced the original aboriginal claim by Native Americans. Although the
original theft of aboriginal land was unjustified, as time progressed, British civilization spread
further into the American wilderness under English law and governance, and hence warranted
the mother country’s possession and regulation of American colonies.
Johnson’s allegiance to ideas about original dominion in defense of Native Americans
also included a Lockean faith in universal human equality. In fact, Johnson’s hatred of slavery,
especially of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, is based on a Lockean principle of an innate,
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universal human equality. According to James Boswell’s biography, The Life of Samuel Johnson
(1791), Johnson in 1777 detailed his condemnation of slavery in a legal brief written for the
freeing of a black British slave, Joseph Knight, and Johnson’s words are direct derivatives of
Locke’s Second Treatise. He writes:
It must be agreed that in most ages many countries have had part of their
inhabitants in a state of slavery; yet it may be doubted whether slavery
can ever be supposed the natural condition of men. It is impossible not
to conceive that men in their original state were equal; and very difficult
to imagine how one would be subjected to another but by violent
compulsion…No man is by nature the property of another (Johnson qtd.
by Boswell, pp. 202-203).
Johnson suggests that the only means by which one is put into a state of slavery, is not through
consent but by force. This violates Locke’s leading assumption that man is “to have the law of
nature as his rule…and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of
another man” (Locke, 15). Arbitrary power that places a man under the dominion of another
reduces him to a state of slavery, and violates his innate natural rights. Johnson’s legal brief
echoes Lockean principles, in suggesting that Joseph Knight be freed due to Knight’s innate
natural liberties and equality derived from a state of nature. In Taxation No Tyranny, Johnson
even goes to the extent of criticizing the colonists’ hypocritical views of upholding Lockean
principle about human equality while holding slaves. He states that “the slaves should be set free,
an act which surely the lovers of liberty cannot but recommend” (Johnson, 130). Utilizing
sarcasm, he condemns the colonists’ use of Lockean innate natural rights to protest taxation by
the mother country while they blatantly are violating such principles as owners of slaves.
Jefferson also affirms a Lockean belief in the same universal inalienable rights—life,
liberty, and property (pursuit of happiness as expressed in the Declaration of Independence).
However, the two writers fundamentally disagreed about Locke’s concept of the “state of
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nature.” Jefferson argues that Britain’s infringement of these rights bound originally in a state of
nature, requires separation from the mother country, and imagines something like a return to the
state of nature in order to erect a new government in the Declaration of Independence. Johnson
is fundamentally against this argument because any abstract notion of an original state of nature,
before the creation of human societies, must give way to historical reality of nations and
governments with laws and conventions restricting while protecting individuals.
Written a year prior to Jefferson’s Declaration, Taxation No Tyranny is obviously no
direct response to Jefferson’s work, and Johnson possessed no knowledge of the arguments being
formulated in Jefferson’s Declaration. Taxation No Tyranny is written in defense of the political
status quo of England, and argues against the American colonies and their rebellious citizens,
stressing that the “state of nature” that the Americans want to return to no longer exists. This is
because English civil society has already evolved over centuries, replacing and nullifying any
“state of nature.” In order for one to completely return to a Lockean “state of nature,” one must
reject society, its comforts, luxuries, and its productions (including government), and opt for a
non-existent primitive state.
In Taxation No Tyranny, the stress is on a fully formed British mother country that is well
beyond any theoretical state of nature. Johnson emphasizes the fundamentals of parliamentary
sovereignty and British power over its territories and colonies as English law demands. The little
known basis for Johnsons’ overarching stress on parliamentary sovereignty and colonial
dependence under English law in his pamphlet, was found in law lectures that Johnson wrote in
secret collaboration with Sir Robert Chambers in A Course of Lectures on the English Law
(1766-1767). In these Lectures compiled by Thomas M. Curley in 1986 for Clarendon Press,
Johnson states that “the [American] colonies are bound by all the statutes of the British

Wright 5

legislature in which the colonies are particularly and generally named, I have already shown to
be the opinion of most learned lawyers…” (Lectures, 290-292). Almost ten years before
Taxation No Tyranny was written, Johnson was affirming, using the same language at times, that
the colonies are bound by the decrees of the omnicompetent king-in-Parliament at Westminster,
and are under its full jurisdiction. The consensus among British lawyers, backs Johnson’s claims.
Further, he addresses the question of taxation, which was igniting American rebellion in events
like The Boston Tea Party (1773). However, the enjoyment of protections afforded the colonies
by Britain, makes them subject to the kingdom of Britain, especially in light of the crushing
expense Parliament assumed in defending colonists against French encroachment during the
Seven Years’ War (1763). Not taxing the colonies would be “…to afford protection without the
return of obedience” (Lectures, pp. 290-292), and some return of obedience is now expected
from the ungrateful colonists. In preserving the British body politic for all subject; “It appears
reasonable to conclude that all colonies may…be taxed by the English legislature, on principles
equally reasonable and just with those on which the public expenses are levied on the greater part
of their fellow subjects” (Lectures, pp. 290-292). The same ideology regarding Johnson’s view
of taxation manifests itself in Taxation No Tyranny, written as a direct response to open rebellion
abroad by fellow subjects unwilling to pay their part for their own protection in the mother
country.
The American grievance against Britain outlined in The Declaration of Independence
“for imposing taxes on [America] without our consent” (Jefferson, 708), is refuted by Johnson on
the legal grounds of Britain’s parliamentary control, under English Common Law. As Johnson
outlines in Taxation, his rebuttal of the American grievance directly reflects his legal work with
Sir Robert Chambers. Johnson begins by stating that “[a] tax is a payment exacted by authority
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from part of the community for the benefit of the whole” (Johnson, 104). He elaborates, stating:
“From whom, and in what proportion such payment shall be required…those only are to judge to
whom government is intrusted” (Johnson, 104). Under English law binding all subjects at home
and abroad, government and the power to levy taxes are vested in the king-in-Parliament, the
ultimate legal authority.
The Americans are calling for a representative democracy with localized representation;
however, the system they are subjected to does not allow for this localized representation. Thus,
the Americans voice a grievance against Parliament’s restriction on rights of local representation
in their colonial legislatures and in the Parliament at Westminster. In rebuttal of this argument of
under-representation, Johnson turns to an argument originally made the lectures he composed
with Robert Chambers. To the objection that the “colonies cannot legally be taxed,” Johnson
insists on the historical reality of general representation, however imperfect, for all British
subjects in Parliament, and “every subject of this kingdom is taxed by the consent of his
representatives” (Lectures, pp. 290-292). Because taxation of the colonies proves highly
beneficial for both the colonists and the entire of kingdom of England, the common good of
taxing them is clear. They enjoy security from foreign enemies by an army, and at least virtual
representation in the legislature of the mother country. The lectures close with: “the happiness of
the whole is the happiness of its parts” (Chambers qtd. by Curley, 109), and Johnson reiterates
this point in Taxation No Tyranny: “The mother country always considers the colonies…as parts
of itself; the prosperity or unhappiness of either is the prosperity or unhappiness of both”
(Johnson, 425-427). The relationship between the colonies and the mother country, Johnson
argues, is essentially codependent. The mother country provides protection, trade, and social
order; while the colonies provide commerce/trade, imperialistic expansion, manpower, and
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constituents. This is why Johnson writes Taxation with a fear of rebellion, because not only are
the colonists lacking legal ground to rebel, but rebellion means war, and war would certainly
weaken and compromise both entities.
Johnson’s argument in Taxation No Tyranny, is that “all the subordinate communities are
liable to taxation, because they all share the benefits of government, and therefore ought all to
furnish their proportion of the expence” (Johnson, 417-418). As long as the colonies are
constituents of the British Empire, subjection to the kingdom of Great Britain is absolute because
of the legal priority of the home government over the local concerns and complaints of the
colonies. However unfair the colonists might deem their denial of direct representation in
Parliament, their virtual representation through elected representatives in England has been the
time-honored legal custom permitted to them. Their ancestors consented to this legal custom at
least tacitly, and this original consent binds them still in the eighteenth century.
The original members of the colonies, still in allegiance to the British Empire, gave the
government their consent to virtual, not direct, representation in exchange for protection.
Johnson states:
“The colonists are descendants of men, who either had no vote in
elections, or who voluntarily resigned them for something, in their
opinion, of more estimation: they have therefore exactly what their
ancestors left them, not a vote in making laws, or in constituting
legislators, but the happiness of being protected by law, and the duty of
obeying it” (Johnson, 115).
Johnson argues that in exchange for protection, the colonists forfeited the luxury of direct
representation. Their property which was delineated via grants by the British Empire is subject to
taxation because of their original consent and enjoyment of property sanctioned by English law.
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John Locke in his political work Second Treatise of Government, argues that once out of
the “state of nature,” man can no longer return to a primitive, primordial situation of being
without a society. His elaboration of this point suggests that once man is a subject to a
government or civil society, an individual has a duty to preserve and contribute to the overall
commonwealth. In a society, government is erected “for the regulating and preserving of
property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws” (Locke,
4). A citizen must contribute to said society, either through express consent or tacit consent. If
one enjoys the luxuries and protection of a governing apparatus, and the security of such, he
thereby consents at least tacitly. For the American colonists, their tacit consent explains their
subjection to the government of Great Britain and therefore to English taxation. Having ample
superiority over the ruling empire in the 1700’s, Britain needed revenue to maintain such a
massive empire. As noted previously, the Seven Years’ War depleted resources, and it was not
only the British subjects in England that were obligated to contribute, but its colonies as well.
Upon their first introduction, land grants sold by the British Empire created private
property ownership. This allowed farms to expand, and commerce to improve in New England.
However, the land delineated was subject to British rule and ultimate control of the mother
country which sponsored and protected colonization. Johnson argues that “however distant…”
the American colonies:
…have been constituent parts of the British Empire. The inhabitants
incorporated by English Charters, are entitled to all the rights of
Englishmen. They are governed by English laws, entitled to English
dignities, regulated by English counsels, and protected by English arms;
and it seems to follow by consequence not easily avoided, that they are
subject to English government, and chargeable by English taxation
(Johnson, 110).
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Johnson’s argument in Taxation No Tyranny is grounded in a history of British colonial rule
from the time of the Jamestown settlement of 1607 to more than one-hundred and fifty years
later. Johnson’s perspective is in accordance with Locke’s Second Treatise. Johnson believes that
American colonial subjects are beyond a period of dissenting from the tacit consent of original
colonizers to begin a new nation. He stresses the present situation of the British body politic, and
that western society has progressed to the point that “the power of every people consisted in
union, produced by one common interest” (Johnson, 106).
If Johnson appealed to Lockean ideals of human equality to defend the slave minority in
America but demanded obedience from the colonial majority to Parliament, then Jefferson
upheld a very different, sometimes contrary, point of view in the Declaration of Independence.
Whereas Johnson explicitly denounced slavery for violating human equality in Taxation No
Tyranny, and even suggested that blacks create a free American state, Jefferson makes a ringing
affirmation of the “self-evident” truth of universal human equality and then, even if reluctantly,
omitted his argument condemning King George III for condoning slave-trading in the
document’s final version to placate members of the second Continental Congress with a vested
interest in preserving slavery. It is true that many scholars have maintained that the Declaration
of Independence is indebted to John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, especially in
proclaiming the God-given equality of humanity. The document’s dependence on the Second
Treatise is not only a general intellectual inspiration, but the famous preamble introducing
specific colonial grievances against King George III also echoes Locke’s work in specific
content, similar phraseology, and even chronological order of Locke’s argumentation. In fact, the
preamble might well amount to an eloquent synopsis of the Second Treatise, almost chapter-bychapter.
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Near the opening of the Treatise, in Chapter II, “Of the State of Nature,” Locke begins by
discussing original political power and rights. He writes:
We must consider what state all men are naturally in [in a primordial
state of nature], and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or
depending upon the will of any other man…for men [are] all the
workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker (Locke, pp.
4-5).
Jefferson reiterates this sentiment in the opening lines of the preamble. Jefferson famously states:
“When…it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve…political bands…and to assume the
separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them”
(Jefferson, 706). The similarities in thought between Locke and Jefferson’s language include the
idea of freedom and natural equality, under an omnipotent God, Jefferson referring to “nature’s
God” and Locke to an “omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker.”
Jefferson’s preamble, in its unfolding, also echoes Locke’s subsequent argumentation in
Chapter VII: “Of Political or Civil Society:”
Man, being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom and
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of
nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world, has
by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is, his life,
liberty, and estate—against the attempts and injuries of other men, but to
judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others (Locke, 48).
In accordance with this statement, Jefferson claims “all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness” (Jefferson, 706). It is evident that the phraseology is very similar
between the two passages, except that Jefferson changed Lockean “property” to the phrase
“pursuit of happiness” among the inalienable God-given rights of humanity
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Further in the preamble, Jefferson reiterates ideas in Locke’s next chapter on creating a
government only by the consent of individuals willing to abandon a “state of nature.” “[To]
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed” (Jefferson, 706). Chapter VIII of the Treatise, “Of the Beginning of
Political Societies,” is the basis for this radical idea. According to Locke, in order to secure the
rights of men, governments are instituted by means of consent. “No one can be put out of this
[state of nature] and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent” (Locke,
54). Man can only be put out of this state of nature when “any number of men have so consented
to make one community or government…thereby presently incorporated” (Locke, 55).
Lastly, Jefferson looks to Locke’s subsequent Chapter 18 regarding the dissolution of
government for inspiration in writing the final section of the preamble. Jefferson closes with the
following statement before he begins listing the many specific grievances against George III:
But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, begun at a
distinguished period and pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a
design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is
their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for
their future security…the present king of Great Britain is a history of
unremitting injuries and usurpations…but all have in direct object the
establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states (Jefferson, 706).
Jefferson’s defense of separating from England because of its accumulated tyrannical conduct
toward the colonies is derived directly from passages in Chapter 18 “Of Tyranny” where Locke
claims that if men “see several experiments made of arbitrary power…” and “…a long train of
actions…how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind which
way things are going, or from casting about how to save himself” (Locke, 118). Locke’s “long
train of actions” became Jefferson’s “long train of abuses” justifying rebellion against Great
Britain. From the standpoint of comparable ideas, language, and even organization of arguments,
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The Declaration of Independence would seem an eloquent reformulation of The Second Treatise
of Government on the state of nature, the formation of political society, and the dissolution of
government.
If Jefferson’s Lockean assertion of universal human equality in a state of nature is a selfevident truth, one in which his entire argument is founded upon, then it is unsettling to say the
least, that Jefferson let his colleagues in Congress persuade him to delete his condemnation of
King George III’s supposed support of the slave trade. In order to avoid offending colonial slave
holders, Jefferson removed the passage for the political reason of unanimity in accepting the
Declaration by Congress and not for the moral and intellectual consistency of the document’s
argumentation. He certainly undermines his Lockean claim that all men are created equal in a
state of nature.
Two other inconsistencies muddle the strength of Jefferson’s rhetoric in the Declaration.
The charge against King George III about preventing “the population of these states; for that
purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners, refusing to encourage their
migrations hither” (Jefferson, 707), is largely specious under English law. That is because King
George III has no sovereignty over non-British foreigners, and could only have the power to
encourage or discourage emigration by British subjects. Secondly, Jefferson claims that King
George III “has made [American] judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries” (Jefferson, 707). Under the British
Constitution, appointments to the judiciary are ultimately dependent directly upon the British
monarch, being George III at the time of the American Revolution.
Perhaps the most glaring mistake in the argumentation of the Declaration of
Independence is its highly questionable dismissal of Parliament’s ultimately absolute sovereignty
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over the thirteen colonies. Even before war decides this issue for either side, Jefferson takes the
erroneous position of a complete absence of parliamentary sovereignty in British America,
claiming that the colonies are already a self-contained, almost autonomous group of powers with
no jurisdictional ties to the king-in-Parliament. For example, Jefferson claims that “[King George
III] has combined with others to subject [American colonists] to a jurisdiction foreign to
[American] constitutions and unacknowledged by [American] laws” (Jefferson, 708). However,
English Common Law clearly justified the supreme power of the king-in-Parliament over all
British subjects, whether at home or abroad. King George III had justifiable standing to levy
sanctions and control over laws being made within such supreme jurisdiction. For Jefferson to
state that British rule is “foreign” to American colonists is false on legal grounds because until
war decides which governing body would be victorious, colonists remained subject to English
Common Law and parliamentary oversight.
Therefore, although Samuel Johnson had no knowledge of the argument(s) Jefferson
would express in The Declaration of Independence, his legal logic in Taxation No Tyranny
adheres to English Common Law and legal tradition authorizing parliamentary oversight by the
king-in-Parliament. Written as a pamphlet to alert citizens about the need for careful thinking
and interpretation of political documents and arguments, he expressed the legal parameters of
what he considered to be an unjust, illegal opposition to British power in the Americas. His
arguments are sometimes grounded in Lockean philosophy derived from The Second Treatise of
Government, and his utilization of the “state of nature,” consent, and human equality arguments,
in their earliest form, were found in early law lectures during his collaboration with Sir Robert
Chambers. From the standpoint of arguments made in the law lectures almost a decade prior,
Taxation No Tyranny aimed to show that the American colonies’ adherence to British subjection
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was not simply consensual, but legally binding. As opposed to Jefferson, Johnson provides legal
justification for his legal arguments not only by appealing to Lockean ideals on the law of nature,
but by laying down time-honored legal principles developed under English jurisprudence since at
least the sixteenth century. No doubt Jefferson’s work was inspired by John Locke’s Second
Treatise to an extent that echoes phraseology, chronology, and argumentation. In doing so, he
voices the American political consensus of the period. The Declaration of Independence stands
perhaps as the most important political document of modern times and has won the admiration of
people around the world. Nevertheless, the legal logic of Johnson’s pamphlet reminds us to
always seek out the truth behind the powerful rhetoric of Jeffersonian argumentation and to
separate propaganda from fact in political controversy. After all, a comparison of disparate
points of views brings us closer to understanding the hard truths to be found in coming to grips
with the often conflicting demands of law and liberty, civil order and individual freedom, in the
perpetual pursuit of happiness.
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